3 years after Robert MacLean beat TSA’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court: The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) ordered the DHS Secretary to conduct an investigation—per Federal law 5 U.S.C. § 1213—of the discovery by MacLean of a new danger to pilots without the installation of cockpit secondary barriers
Before he beat the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) and obtained legal whistleblower protection status from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Robert J. MacLean stopped TSA from violating law and forced it to deploy FAMs onto terrorist-targeted nonstop, long-distance flights—like those attacked on 9/11. Suicidal hijackers plotted to exploit State Department visa and TSA security screening loopholes.
Hijackers were simply going to wait for pilots to unlock and open the post-9/11-impenetrable cockpit doors—reinforced since April 4, 2003 after a January 15, 002 retrofit-mandate in order to use the lavatory:
For six years TSA tried to hide this fact until MacLean filed a second Freedom of Information Act Request (FOIA) for its July 26, 2003 wait-for-pilots-to-use-lavatory hijack warning:
The day after MacLean’s July 2003 disclosures, numerous bipartisan members of Congress protested. All day TSA denied there was such a plan until finally admitting that it made a “mistake” and canceled its plan. Senate Judiciary Chairman U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairman U.S. Senator Ron Johnson would support MacLean before the Supreme Court and in a subsequent Senate hearing, respectively. Congress blasted TSA’s inane cost-savings plan devised due to wasting $1.4 MILLION on cash bonuses for TSA senior executive. MacLean also reversed dangerous grooming standards, dress codes, and boarding procedures that compromised the identity of FAMs. Despite MacLean successfully fixing these security lapses, TSA fired him on April 10, 2006, and again on March 26, 2019.
U.S. Senate Minority Leader Charles “Chuck” Schumer,
Months after MacLean’s July 2003 disclosures—the airlines began to deploy steel 12-cable flight deck (cockpit) Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB). The 12-cable IPSB could only stop suicidal attackers from rushing the flight deck when pilots unlocked and opened it in order to get food, sleep, or use the lavatory. Unfortunately, the 12-cable IPSB cannot stop firearms or opioid fentanyl attacks on an unlocked cockpit.
Due to being COST-prohibited—caused by aircraft downtime to repair them—the airlines have stopped installing 12-cable IPSBs or removed them from entire fleets.
The 12-cable IPSB (PHOTO) is also dangerous due to the fact they get damaged from passengers’ roller-bags and can fall into the main egress area and hinder evacuation.
Being exposed to the main cabin, the 12-cable IPSB can also be sabotaged with a common carry-on item or nonflammable glue.
“MacLean uncovered that TSA does not ensure that Air Marshals and flight crews are equipped with NARCAN, the antidote for the deadly synthetic opioids fentanyl and carfentinal, and that TSA exempts religious food trucks from airport security inspections.”
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia: “And [MacLean] was successful...[TSA] called off the [long distance, nonstop flight] cancellations.”
4 months before then-Federal Air Marshal Robert MacLean’s “[hijackers would again breach cockpits] shortly after takeoff” July 29, 2003 disclosure—cited in his Supreme Court of the United States decision—pilots were openly protesting to the Associated Press and CBS News the fact that airlines were directing drink-carts and crew members’ bodies to protect routinely unlocked cockpits when pilots open them to sleep (cross-ocean flights), get food-trays, or to use the lavatory:
“April 4, 2003 • Bulletproof Cockpit Doors A Reality
But there are times when a pilot may open the door—to visually check wing surfaces, use the bathroom and change flight crews during a long trip. That leaves the possibility the cockpit could be rushed by a hijacker. ‘[The newly armored cockpit door is] a barrier when it’s closed, it’s an entry when it’s open,’ said Capt. Steve Luckey, chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association’s national security committee. ... Israel’s national airline, EL AL, has among the most stringent security requirements. All its planes have double doors separated by a narrow hallway, said Offer Einav, former security director for the airline. Pilots must close one door before opening the other, he said.”
“While in Karachi, [‘9/11 principal architect’ Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (‘KSM’)] also discussed how to case flights in Southeast Asia. KSM told [the hijackers] to watch the [cockpit] doors at takeoff and landing, to observe whether the [pilots] went to the lavatory during the flight, and to note whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.”
“The best time to storm the cockpit would be about 10-15 minutes after takeoff, when the cockpit doors typically were opened for the first time. ... While [lead hijacker Mohammed Atta] mentioned general ideas such as using a hostage or claiming to have a bomb, he was confident the cockpit doors would be opened and did not consider breaking them down a viable idea.”